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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant/Defendant appeals from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (l)-(4). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should this Court reverse the trial court's conclusion of law that the 
Appellant/Defendant was guilty of all the elements of forgery when one element was 
missing by the court's own declaration—that his purpose in committing the forgery was 
to do the right thing, which purpose is contrary to forgery's element to defraud. 
Standard of Review. This Court will review this issue under the correctness 
standard for legal error committed by the trial court in its use of fixed principles and rules 
of law, determining whether the trial court incorrectly selected, interpreted or applied the 
law. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). It gives no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions of law. 
2. Should this Court reverse the trial court's finding that the 
Appellant/Defendant lacked authority to use Mr. Scott Abbott's name when he had given 
prior, written authorization to use his name in the way the Appellant/Defendant used it? 
Standard of Review. This Court will review this issue under the clearly erroneous 
standard to determine whether the marshaled evidence fails to support the findings while 
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (clearly erroneous standard of review); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. 
4 
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v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (marshaling requirement); Johnson v. 
ffigley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
3. Should this Court reverse the trial court's finding that the 
Appellant/Defendant lacked authority to correct deed of trust errors when Mr. Scott 
Abbott provided him with the pre-signed and notarized deeds of trust for this very 
purpose and did not finally revoke in writing the authority to use them until a year after 
the alleged forgery of the partial deed of trust? 
Standard of Review. This Court will review this issue under the clearly erroneous 
standard to determine whether the marshaled evidence fails to support the findings while 
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (clearly erroneous standard of review); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. 
v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (marshaling requirement); Johnson v. 
ffigley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
According to the forgeiy law, found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(l)-(4): 
(1) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information 
including forms such as: (a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, 
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification; (b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other 
instrument or writing issued by a government or any agency; or (c) a check, 
an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an 
interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim 
against any person or enterprise. 
(2) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: (a) 
5 
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alters any writing of another without his authority or utters the altered 
writing; or (b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication, 
or utterance: (i) purports to be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent; (ii) purports to be an act on behalf of another party 
with the authority of that other party; or (iii) purports to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, 
or to be a copy of an original when an original did not exist. 
(3) It is not a defense to a charge of forgery under Subsection (2)(b)(ii) if an 
actor signs his own name to the writing if the actor does not have authority 
to make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter 
the writing on behalf of the party for whom the actor purports to act. 
(4) Forgery is a third degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The State charged Appellant/Defendant by information with forgery, a third 
degree felony. R001. At a bench trial, the judge found him guilty. R069. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 23, 2011, the district court held a bench trial in this criminal forgery 
matter and found the Defendant guilty. R065-071. 
2. When finding guilt, the trial court stated, "I think he was trying to do the right 
thing," (Rl 10:223, lines 18-19) but found conclusively that what he did was "in 
accordance with what the elements are of the charge." Rl 10:223, line 20-21. 
3. In its minutes, the Court stated, "The court finds that Mr. Robbennolt had no 
authority to use Mr. Abbott's signature when he did and therefore, finds the 
defendant guilty of count 1." R069-071. Emphasis added. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. Testimony at the preliminary hearing and at trial from Mr. Abbott revealed that 
he did not give the Appellant/Defendant explicit, verbal authority to use his 
signature on the partial deed of trust delivered to Mr. Mangum. R109:13, lines 
21-22, R109:16, lines 10-11, Rl 10. 
5. Evidence admitted at trial showed written authority from Mr. Abbott for the 
Appellant/Defendant to act in his behalf for the company in managing the day-to-
day company projects. R i l l : "Keystone Restructuring Agreement-A," Ex. 1, p. 
5, §5.1. 
6. This management also included "balanced risk management." R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 
1, p. 5, §5.1. 
7. The management included the highest duty: "to lead, operate, and manage 
Keystone to the best interest of Keystone." R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.1. 
8. Managing the operations of Keystone involved executing and delivering "all 
documents" that "may be reasonably necessary to effectuate the provisions of this 
Agreement-A." R i l l : "Stocks Purchase Agreement-B" (SPAB), Ex. 2, pp.5-6, 
§2 ("Agreement-A to Perform Necessary Acts"). 
9. One of the day-to-day company projects that the Appellant/Defendant was 
managing involved the master deed of trust on the Townsend, Montana property. 
R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 2, pp.3-4, §2 ("Existing Keystone Projects"). 
10. The Townsend, Montana property master deed of trust was a Keystone asset, not 
an Abbott-owned asset, although it was titled in Mr. Abbott's name. R i l l : 
KRAA, Ex. 1, pp.3-4, §2 ("Existing Keystone Projects"). 
7 
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11. Mr. Mangum, the victim of the alleged forgery, entered into an investment 
contract which mandated that his investment "shall" be secured by a partial deed 
of trust. Rl 11: "JR Partnership Agreement," Ex.3, p.4, §5("Security"). 
12. The partial deed of trust was to the master deed of trust on the Townsend, 
Montana property. R109:4, lines 12-13, R i l l : Ex. A, p.l. 
13. The Appellant/Defendant and Mr. Mangum understood that Mr. Mangum was 
owed a partial deed of trust. R109:4-5, R109:6, line 4. 
14. As security for Mr. Mangum's investment, the partial deed of trust was not 
delivered to him. R109:4, lines 18-19. 
15. When Mr. Mangum told the Appellant/Defendant of the error, the 
Appellant/Defendant sought to correct the deficiency by delivering a partial deed 
of trust to Mr. Mangum on the Keystone asset—the master deed of trust on the 
Townsend, Montana property. R109:5, lines 3-21. 
16. Mr. Mangum believed that he immediately recognized the partial deed of trust as 
a forgery because the date on the deed preceded his request and it had Mr. 
Abbott's name on it. R109:5, lines 15-25, 
17. Mr. Mangum spoke to Mr. Abbott about whether he signed the particular, partial 
deed of trust he had been given. R109:6, lines 17-25, R109:7, lines 1-3. 
18. Mr. Abbott denied signing the notarized, partial deed of trust that the 
Appellant/Defendant had delivered to Mr. Mangum. R109:6, lines 17-25, 
R109:7, lines 1-3, R109:22-23. 
8 
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19. The notarized, partial deed of trust, however, came from the blank, pre-signed, 
and already notarized deeds of trust that Mr. Abbott had given in 2007 to the 
Appellant/Defendant to use at the outset of managing Keystone to correct deed of 
trust errors. R109:16, lines 19-24, R109:18, lines 3-4, R109:20, lines 7-8, 20-21. 
20. Although the two had significant disagreements about the management of 
Keystone and other personal problems before 2009 (R109:13, lines 3-6), Mr. 
Abbott never withdrew the authority in writing he had given to the 
Appellant/Defendant to use the notarized deeds of trust until 2010. Rl 11: "Due 
Diligence & Evidence Agreement," Ex. 15, p.2, #6, Rl 10. 
21. The alleged forgery using the pre-signed and notarized deed previously given to 
him occurred in 2009. R109:5, lines 9-12, R109:21, lines 16-18. 
22. The trial court judge found that the Appellant/Defendant was trying to do the 
right thing by delivering the partial deed of trust to Mr. Mangum. R067-
069:"SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT"; Rl 10:223, lines 18-19 
"TRANSCRIPT for hearing 2-23-2011." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a matter of law, the forgery conviction must be reversed for legal error because 
the element of intent to defraud was not found. The trial court, in fact, found the 
opposite. It found the Appellant/Defendant was trying to do the right thing, which is 
completely counter to the intent to trick, deceive, or defraud anyone. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
From an evidentiary perspective, the trial court was clearly erroneous in its finding 
of no authority to sign. Substantial reasons existed to doubt the lack of authority. 
Although Mr. Scott Abbott verbally claimed at trial that he did not give specific 
authorization for the Appellant/Defendant to use his signature for the partial deed of trust 
and that the two had major disagreements about Keystone before 2009, the written 
evidence shows he contractually gave the Appellant/Defendant that authority by 2008, if 
not in 2007. The authority to use Mr. Scott Abbott's name in behalf of their joint-
business lasted until it was contractually signed away in its entirety in 2010, covering the 
2009 time period in which the alleged forgery occurred. 
The written evidence also shows that by giving the Appellant/Defendant pre-
signed deeds of trust in 2007, Mr. Scott Abbott empowered the Appellant/Defendant to 
correct any deed of trust errors. Correcting such errors was consistent with the 
contractual authority Mr. Abbott gave him to do, which authority to use the pre-signed 
deeds of trust lasted until 2010 when it was contractually disaffirmed in writing and 
signed by Mr. Abbott. 
From 2007 to 2010, therefore, the Appellant/Defendant had (1) written 
authorization during the time of the alleged forgery to use Mr. Abbott's signature for the 
day-to-day operations of their joint company and he had (2) the intention to do what was 
right in using Mr. Abbott's name. On the basis of written authority and the basis of 
proper intent, the conviction for forgery must be set aside. 
10 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE CAN BE NO CONVICTION FOR FORGERY BECAUSE THE 
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT FIND ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS: 
INTENT TO DEFRAUD 
According to Utah's statute on forgery, a "person is guilty of forgery i f he does 
so "with purpose to defraud anyone." U.C.A. § 76-6-50l(l)-(4). The Utah Supreme 
Court stated specifically that "[sjigning another's name may be no crime, but doing so 
with intent to defraud makes the act forgery. In these and numerous other crimes a 
particular purpose, motive of intent[,] is a necessary element within the meaning of the 
statute." State v. Turner, 282 P. 2d 1045 (Utah 1955) (citations and quotations omitted); 
see also State v. Winward, 909 P. 2d 909, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("To commit 
forgery, one must possess the specific intent to defraud 'anyone' [or have knowledge that 
he is facilitating a fraud] Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995). See State v. Turner, 3 Utah 
2d 285, 288, 282 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1955) (Crockett, J., concurring)."). The intent, which 
is a necessary element of forgery, must be nothing short of the intent to defraud. 
The State's Exhibit A is a "Partial Assignment of Deed of Trust," purportedly 
from Mr. Scott Abbott to Mr. William Brent Mangum. R i l l : State's Ex. A, p.l. The 
subject property is in a master deed of trust on property located in 
"Townsend,...Montana." IdL The Appellant/Defendant was found guilty of forging this 
document. R069-071: "SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT"; R110: 
"TRANSCRIPT for hearing 2-23-2011." 
l l 
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In contradiction to its conclusionary statement that "he was trying to defraud in 
accordance with what the elements are of the charge" (R069-071: "SENTENCE, 
JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT"; Rl 10:223, lines 20-21, the district court failed to find 
any facts of fraud in its judgment for forgery. For example, it did not find any facts from 
which an inference of fraud could be made—no facts that the Appellant/Defendant would 
benefit from the transaction at the cost of someone else, no facts showing any reason the 
Appellant/Defendant may have had to defraud the alleged victim, Mr. Mangum, and, 
outside of their litigious relationship, the court found no facts showing how this 
transaction would be fraudulent or detrimental in any way to Mr. Abbott. The trial court 
simply found "no authority to sign." Id In fact, it stated, "And, again, it seems to me 
that Mr. Robbennolt was trying to do what he could to make things right... .1 think he was 
trying to do the right thing." Rl 10:223, lines 12-14, 18-19. Emphasis added. The trial 
court found that the Appellant/Defendant's intention was the opposite of one to defraud; 
it found that his intent or purpose was to do the right thing. This kind of intent or purpose 
could not be more contrary to the intent to defraud. 
After an analysis of the facts, the trial court came to a summation. The sequence 
of concepts in the summation is significant. First, it spoke about (1) the lack of authority 
and then second, it spoke of (2) the intent involved, which are the two major elements of 
forgery. It explained as follows in the sequence of concepts or elements: "Why didn't the 
Defendnat Mr. Robbennolt sign his own name? Because he couldn't. He needed Mr. 
Abbott's signature. [1] That authority was not given. [2] And again it seems to me that 
12 
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Mr. Robbennolt was trying to do what he could to make things right....I think he was 
trying to do the right thing." Rl 10:223, lines 12-14, 18-19. Numbers added. The 
concepts expressed in sequence here show that the Appellant/Defendant had no authority 
to sign, but that he was trying to do the right thing in what he did. 
A reading of the entire judgment reveals that having "no authority to sign" 
(Rl 10:222, lines 9-10) was the only element the court actually analyzed in its 
determination as to whether the Appellant/Defendant committed forgery. See Rl 10:223, 
lines 1-8; Rl 10:223, lines 9-12; Rl 10:223, lines 19-20. 
In marshaling the evidence, the Appellant/Defendant notes that the trial court 
began to analyze the facts for fraud. It stated, "The question is did he do that to defraud? 
Was his purpose to defraud? And so I've set forth some things here that I want to 
mention." Rl 10:221, lines 13-15. Then, instead of directing its findings to the facts that 
show the Defendant's intent, it focused on the witnesses: "Credibility of the witnesses is 
always at issue in these types of cases....It's clear to me that all parties were credible in, 
in what they were trying to relate to the Court." Rl 10:221, lines 16-17, 21-23. 
Witnesses, however, cannot speculate as to the intent of a defendant's mind; therefore, 
this focus on the credibility of witnesses does nothing to explore the question of whether 
the Defendant had in his mind to defraud anyone. 
Next, the court went on to discuss what it believed was the underlying subject: 
"money, money, money is what we're dealing with here. That's the ultimate cause of 
what's going on." As stated, this acknowledgment about money does nothing to 
13 
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enlighten us on the Appellant/Defendant's intentions. If evidence had suggested that the 
Appellant/Defendant would have gained money through this alleged forgery, then that 
could have helped, but the facts never established how the Appellant/Defendant would 
have profited or that he did profit from the alleged forgery here. There was no evidence. 
The initial investment money for the partial deed of trust did not pass through his hands. 
R109:7-8, lines 21-25, 1-2. The court's general reference to money, without any specific 
application, is simply a complaint that if there had been no money to purchase anything, 
then this problem would never have happened. 
The court next stated, "Trust, trust, trust." This general reference to trust, 
however, was not applied to any specific person or set of facts. Other than the accusation 
of forgery, there were no facts or evidence suggesting the Appellant/Defendant had 
broken any specific trust. Immediately following this mention of trust, though, the court 
held, "the Court does find that Mr. Robbennolt had no authority to sign on Mr. Abbott's 
behalf." Simply having no authority to use another's signature is insufficient for forgery 
because: 
[T]he law does not conclusively presume that because a person signed the 
name of another a forgery has occurred. The act of signing another's name 
without permission does not constitute forgery unless it was done with the 
intent to defraud [or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud]. 
Accordingly, to sustain a conviction for forgery, there must be a sufficient 
connection between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud. In 
establishing the nexus between the intent and the act, the law can presume 
the intention so far as realized in the act, but not an intention beyond what 
was so realized. Moreover, even if a defendant possesses both an intent to 
defraud and commits the act of signing another's name without authority, a 
forgery conviction cannot be sustained unless the act was done in 
furtherance of the intention [or with knowledge that he is facilitating a 
14 
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fraud]. Stated another way, a defendant who has signed another's name 
without permission, while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely 
unrelated to the unauthorized endorsement, has not committed forgery. 
State v. Winward. 909 P. 2d 909, 912-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Citations 
and quotations omitted. Emphasis added. 
In its analysis of the facts, the Court did not cite to any facts that would establish that the 
Defendant was intending to defraud; it only cited facts showing that he did not have 
permission to use another's name and that this was tantamount to fraud, meeting all the 
elements of the crime charged. R069-071: "SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, 
COMMITMENT"; Rl 10:223, lines 19-21, "TRANSCRIPT for hearing 2-23-2011." 
This, though, is legal error. 
As the law above states, the act of signing Mr. Abbott's name, by itself, does not 
constitute forgery, yet that is exactly what the Court found in both its unofficial minutes 
and official judgment: "The court finds that Mr. Robbennolt had no authority to use Mr. 
Abbott's signature when he did and therefore, finds the defendant guilty of count 1." 
R069-071; see also Rl 10:223, lines 12-14, 18-19. ("I think he was trying to do the right 
thing. But it doesn't detract from the fact that no authority to sign and he was trying to 
defraud in accordance with what the elements are of the charge. Therefore, based upon 
that, the court does judge Mr. Robbennolt guilty of the crime of Forgery, a Third Degree 
Felony."). Even assuming the Appellant/Defendant had no authority to sign, this finding 
of "trying to do the right thing" (Id.) is clearly inconsistent with a finding of guilt and the 
intent to defraud. Accordingly, as a matter of law, the conviction for forgery and the 
finding of guilt must be reversed and set aside. 
15 
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, - . . • • • - , . . I I . 
DURING THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED FORGERY, MR. SCOTT ABBOTT 
HAD GIVEN WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION FOR THE 
APPELLANT/DEFENDANT TO USE HIS NAME FOR THE PURPOSE FOR 
WHICH HE USED IT 
As stated above, the trial court found an intent to do right, not one to defraud. The 
trial court also found that the Appellant/Defendant had no authority to sign. This finding, 
however, is contradicted by substantial evidence presented at trial. 
As a part of marshaling the evidence, the Appellant/Defendant notes that the trial 
court mentioned a number of facts why the Appellant/Defendant did not have authority to 
sign for Mr. Abbott on the property in question. It began with "the fact that Mr. Abbott's 
signature was needed because the property was in his name." Rl 10:222, lines 11-13. 
The court continued about Mr. Abbott, "He had to sign." Id at line 13. Then, discussing 
the Appellant/Defendant, the trial court explained that even though he was part of 
Keystone, "because of his history or background... [a] t least in this transaction, he wasn't 
a signer. It was all in Mr. Abbott's name." Id at lines 14-16. Rhetorically, the trial 
court then asked the next logical question, "Was there any contact made with Mr. Abbott 
regarding the transaction by Mr. Robbennolt? Not that I could see. He did this on his 
own" (R110:223, lines 1-3) without "at least ask[ing]...something" (Id at lines 6-7) of 
Mr. Abbott about whether he could use his signature in this transaction. 
Even though the trial court found that the Appellant/Defendant did not have the 
authority to sign Mr. Scott Abbott's name, the written documentation conclusively shows 
that his authority to use Mr. Abbott's name lasted from at least 2008 to 2010, during the 
2009 alleged forgery. 
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In 2008, the Appellant/Defendant and Mr. Scott Abbott acknowledged in writing 
that they were both "cofounders" and "equal...owners" of "Keystone," a Delaware 
corporation formed back in "2006." See R i l l : "Keystone Restructure Agreement-A" 
(KRAA), Ex. 1, p.l. The two parties made reference to the "Townsend, Montana" 
property that was an "existing Company project[] with contracts, options, or title 
ownership." Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, pp.3-4, §2 ("Existing Keystone Projects"). Giving the 
Appellant/Defendant broad authority to act in Keystone's and its investors' best interests 
while managing risk, Mr. Abbott executed the document that states "Robbennolt will 
continue to lead, operate, and manage Keystone to the best interest of Keystone,... and its 
investors...with balanced risk management." R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.1. Emphasis 
added. The Appellant/Defendant's role was active and significant: to lead, to operate, to 
manage, and to do so in the best interest of Keystone, and to balance risks. 
By written contract, Mr. Abbott willfully took on a passive role in dealing with 
Keystone and the Townsend, Montana property because the "Keystone Restructure 
Agreement-A" gave him no duties to lead, or operate, or manage any of Keystone's 
business, properties, or projects. See R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 1. No other subsequent 
document changed his lack of responsibilities to operate Keystone, either. The 
Appellant/Defendant was the only one who had the contractual right and obligation to 
handle business related to the property at issue—the Townsend, Montana property. 
Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.1 And he did just that by issuing a partial deed of trust to 
Mr. Mangum in the master deed of trust that Keystone had on the Townsend, Montana 
property. 
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The alleged forgery in regards to the Townsend, Montana property occurred on or 
about January 9, 2009 (R001: "Information"), during the period when the 
Appellant/Defendant had written authority to operate Keystone in Mr. Abbott's behalf, 
who had the passive role. See Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, p.l (signed in 2008, acknowledging 
co-ownership of Keystone along with Appellant/Defendant managing Keystone) and 
R i l l : "Due Diligence & Evidence Agreement," Ex. 15, p.2, #6 (signed in 2010, 
acknowledging that Appellant/Defendant no longer could use the pre-signed and 
notarized deeds of trust given by Mr. Abbott to Appellant/Defendant in 2007). 
The Appellant/Defendant used Mr. Abbott's name in the partial deed of trust 
consistent with the contractual authority he had been given for the following reasons: 
First, he was to "manage" the day-to-day operations of Keystone, of which Mr. 
Abbott's name was part. See R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 1, p.l and p. 5, §5.1. Thus, the 
Appellant/Defendant was to act in Mr. Abbott's behalf on a daily basis through Keystone. 
He used his name regularly in this way. The two acted under each other's names as a 
part of their business—it was their accepted business practice. See Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, 
p.l, "Recitals" ("Abbott has been keeping and/or holding Robbennolt's Stocks and/or 
400 shares under his name." Emphasis added.); R109:30, lines9-12 ("normal course"). 
Second, the Appellant/Defendant was to act in Keystone's "best interest." R i l l : 
KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.1. It was in Keystone's best interest to correct a partial deed of 
trust error, which deed was rightfully owed on its Townsend, Montana property. 
Consistent with his obligations to act in Keystone's best interests, the 
Appellant/Defendant delivered a partial deed of trust to correct the error Mr. Mangum 
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suffered when the partial deed of trust on that property was not delivered to him as 
contractually required. See R i l l : "JR Partnership Agreement," Ex.3, p.4, §5("Security") 
("This investment shall be secured by a deed of trust against a property.... A separate and 
different Promissory Note and Deed of Trust shall be issued for this investment."). 
Emphasis added. Performing the correcting of a partial deed of trust was explicitly 
permitted by Mr. Abbott. R027: "PRELIMINARY HEARING," R i l l , R109:16, lines 
19-24, R109:18, lines 3-4. 
Third, the Appellant/Defendant not only acted in the best interests of Keystone, 
but also acted to manage "risk," as was his duty. See Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, p.l and p. 5, 
§5.1. It was a risk to Keystone's assets, particularly the Townsend, Montana asset that 
was titled in Mr. Abbott's name (Ril l : KRAA, Ex. 1, pp.3-4, §2 ["Existing Keystone 
Projects"]) if a security for monetary interest that Mr. Mangum had already paid was not 
provided to him. The risk was a lawsuit against the asset holder: Keystone. By 
supplying Mr. Mangum with the partial deed of trust on the Keystone asset that was due 
him, the Appellant/Defendant sought to minimize "risk" (IdL) and perform the contractual 
obligations owed to Mr. Mangum. 
Fourth, because the Townsend, Montana asset was a company asset (Ril l : 
KRAA, Ex. 1, pp.3-4, §2 ["Existing Keystone Projects"]), not a Mr. Abbott asset, and 
because the Appellant/Defendant was the only one to manage the company assets 
according to the authority Mr. Abbott gave him in the "Keystone Restructure Agreement-
A," the Appellant/Defendant did nothing illegal or improper in delivering the partial deed 
of trust on that asset. The partial deed of trust had to have Mr. Abbott's name on it 
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because it was titled in his name, not Keystone's or Mr. Robbennolt's, as the trial court 
noted. Rl 10:222, lines 11-13 ("Mr. Abbott's signature was needed because the property 
was in his name."). Thus, Mr. Abbott had already given the Appellant/Defendant 
authority to use that Townsend, Montana asset with his name titled on it. There was no 
written prohibition from doing so. There was no requirement for any further discussion 
with Mr. Abbott on how the Appellant/Defendant would use it. The 
Appellant/Defendant was to use it in whatever way he thought was in the best interest of 
the company. This authority was not taken away in writing until 2010 in the final "Due 
Diligence & Evidence Agreement." See R i l l : Ex. 15, p. 1. 
The State may cite to the "Conflict of Interest" provision for required 
consultations in the "Keystone Restructuring Agreement-A," but it is inapplicable 
because no anticipated conflict of interest had arisen at that time. The only conflict 
anticipated was one where the Appellant/Defendant may want "to enter into a real estate 
development relationship with a MCI Development or Keystone Contact." R i l l : 
KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.2. If so, then the requirement to "consult with Abbott and seek his 
approval" (Id.) would apply. Because it did not apply, the Appellant/Defendant did not 
have to seek any further approval from Mr. Abbott to use his name on the company asset 
for Mr. Mangum's partial deed of trust transaction. That transaction was not a "MCI 
Development or Keystone Contact" transaction; thus, no approval was necessary. 
If Mr. Abbott thought his approval for the Keystone day-to-day activities was 
necessary, then he would have reserved it in the contract like he did for the Conflict of 
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Interest provision. But, he did not. In fact, he executed the opposite for the 
Appellant/Defendant: i 
In the counterpart to the first "Keystone Restructuring Agreement-A," Mr. Abbott 
gave the Appellant/Defendant the following right and mandate: the Appellant/Defendant 
"shall execute and deliver all documents.. .that may be reasonably necessary to effectuate 
the provisions of this Agreement-A." Rlll:"Stocks Purchase Agreement-B" (SPAB), 
Ex. 2, pp.5-6, §11 ("Agreement-A to Perform Necessary Acts"). Emphasis added. This 
is precisely what the Appellant/Defendant did when he delivered the partial deed of trust 
document to Mr. Mangum. 
The Appellant/Defendant saw that it was "reasonably necessary to effectuate" the 
operations of Keystone, as outlined in the Keystone Restructing Agreement-A. He then 
acted accordingly. Mr. Abbott did not revoke in writing his written, explicit, broad, and 
sweeping authority to deliver necessary documents at any time before the 
Appellant/Defendant delivered the necessary partial deed of trust to Mr. Mangum. At 
most, the two had had significant business disagreements prior to the deed delivery, but 
not enough to revoke in writing any of the authority given. R109:13, lines 3-6. The 
Appellant/Defendant did nothing to overstep his written authority in acting on behalf of 
Mr. Abbott through Keystone. Accordingly, the factual finding of the trial court that he 
did is clearly erroneous and must be reversed. 
III. 
CONSISTENT WITH THE WRITTEN AUTHORITY, MR. SCOTT ABBOTT 
EMPOWERED THE APPELLANT/DEFENDANT TO CORRECT DEED OF 
TRUST ERRORS WITH THE PRE-SIGNED AND NOTARIZED DEEDS OF 
TRUST HE GAVE HIM 
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According to Mr. Scott Abbott at the preliminary hearing (R027: 
"PRELIMINARY HEARING"; R109: "TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 04-26-2010"), he 
gave the Appellant/Defendant the authority to correct deed of trust errors. R109:16, lines 
19-24, R109:18, lines 3-4, R109:20, lines 7-8, 20-21, R109:21, lines 10-13. Then, 
consistent with that authority, Mr. Abbott gave the Appellant/Defendant the ability to do 
exactly that by the seven or so pre-signed and notarized deeds of trust, as referenced in 
Exhibit 15, "Due Diligence & Evidence Agreement" (DDEA) of February 10, 2010. See 
R i l l ("Envelope of Exhibits"). In that document, it states that the Appellant/Defendant 
affirms that "all known notarized documents signed by Abbott and given to Robbennolt 
in the fall of 2007 have been destroyed." Rl 11: DDEA, Ex. 15, p.l, #3. Attesting to the 
truth of the statements within, Mr. Abbott executed the DDEA document on February 11, 
2010 at 3:01 p.m. See R i l l : DDEA, Ex. 15,p.2,#6. 
With the ability to correct deed of trust errors, the Appellant/Defendant delivered a 
partial deed of trust on Mr. Abbott's and the Appellant/Defendant's business-owned 
master deed of trust for property in Townsend, Montana to Mr. Brent Mangum because 
he had not been given a partial deed of trust as required under his contract. Rl09:4-5, 
R i l l : "JR Partnership Agreement," Ex.3, p.4, §5("Security") ("This investment shall be 
secured by a deed of trust against a property.... A separate and different Promissory Note 
and Deed of Trust shall be issued for this investment." Emphasis added). Mr. Mangum's 
contract was with Mr. Hassan Kassir, who, at the time, represented American Star 
Lending, and who, before 2010, had gained rights to "ownership/control" of the "master 
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deed of trust in Townsend, Montana." See Rl 11: "Relinquishment Agreement," Ex. 13, 
p.l, "Recitals." It was from this master deed of trust that Mr. Mangum was to receive his 
partial deed of trust. Mr. Kassir was to deliver it. He failed to do so. R109:4-5. 
Because Mr. Kassir failed to deliver the partial deed of trust, he later committed to 
do the following: "Relinquish control and rights to Kassir's ownership/control of 
the...master deed of trust in Townsend, Montana to Douglas Scott Abbott." See R i l l : 
"Relinquishment Agreement," Ex. 13, p.l, "Recitals." In this way, Mr. Abbott regained 
control on how the interests in the master deed of trust would be divided, which were 
owned initially by Mr. Kassir before this final agreement. With this ability to control the 
interests, "Douglas Scott Abbott has agreed to give Mangum rights to a fractional portion 
of the [Townsend, Montana] deed of trust." See R i l l : "Relinquishment Agreement," 
Ex. 13, p.l, "Recitals." Thus, Mr. Abbott effected the same resolution that the 
Appellant/Defendant had attempted to do months earlier—making it possible for Mr. 
Mangum to secure his interests in the master deed of trust to the Townsend, Montana 
property. Apparently now satisfied, Mr. Mangum agreed to "irrevocably and 
unconditionally release Kassir, and any of his...representatives (except Kelly 
Robbennolt)...from any and all actions." R i l l : "Settlement and Release Agreement," 
Ex. 14, p.2, §5. The multiple transactions occurring here show that what the 
Appellant/Defendant did was no different in any material way than what Mr. Abbott later 
did for Mr. Mangum. The two both used legal instruments to give Mr. Mangum rights to 
the Townsend, Montana property. The parallel acts demonstrate that the 
Appellant/Defendant did nothing fraudulent with the partial deed of trust because what it 
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would have accomplished was the very same thing that Mr. Abbott accomplished later. 
And he did so using the legal instruments Mr. Abbott had provided him at the outset to 
correct the very problem he sought to solve by delivering the deed: correcting deed of 
trust errors. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court made a legal error when finding the Appellant/Defendant guilty of 
forgery because instead of finding the element of intent to defraud, it found the intent of 
"trying to do the right thing." The trial court was clearly erroneous in its factual finding 
that the Appellant/Defendant lacked the authority to use Mr. Abbott's name in the pre-
signed, notarized deeds of trust because written, contractual authority had already been 
given him to do so. This authority is clearly shown in a number of documents signed 
before the incident. The explicit, written authority was not finally revoked in writing 
until a year after the Appellant/Defendant delivered the alleged forgery. Delivering the 
partial deed of trust to Mr. Mangum with Mr. Abbott's signature on it was fully 
consistent with the Appellant/Defendant's contractual duties, obligations, and rights—he 
did so as a part of his obligations to "manage" the day-to-day projects of Keystone, of 
which the Townsend, Montana property rights were a part; he did so out of his duty to act 
in the "best interest" of Keystone in managing the Townsend, Montana property rights; 
he did so to avoid the risk of lawsuits, which "risk management" was part of his 
contractual job description; and he did so consistent with the pre-signed, notarized deeds 
of trust that Mr. Abbott had given him to correct deed of trust errors, which Mr. 
Mangum's partial deed of trust deficiency was certainly an error to correct. As a result, 
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there was no forgery, legally or factually, and the trial court's judgment of forgery must, 
therefore, be reversed. 
V 2 ^ 
DATED t h i s ^ day of September 2011. 
Taylor C. Hartley 
Attorney at Law 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed or delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to the following this Vfr day of September 2011. 
Criminal Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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1 to Mr. Mangum, had no legal authority, according to 
2 Counsel, to transfer anything out of Keystone. 
3 Their argument is that he transferred 
4 everything into Keystone. So why didn't - if that 
5 document was transferring an interest to Mr. Mangum, 
6 why does it have Scott Abbott's name on there? That's 
7 a fraud right there. He has no authority to pass 
8 anything because, according to Counsel, he's already 
9 given all of his interest to Keystone. And so that 
0 document that was given to Mr. Mangum should have said 
1 either that it was signed by Mr. Robbennolt as himself 
2 or as representing Keystone Venture Group. They were 
3 the only people then that had any authority to 
4 transfer any of that to Mr. Mangum. 
5 Now, Counsel talked about: Where's the 
6 fraud? 
7 Okay, here's the fraud. The fraud is, 
8 first of all, that that document purported to be the 
9 act of Scott Abbott and it was not. He testified 
0 clearly to you, he'd never authorized his signature to 
1 be on that document. He would not have done that. 
2 The document was prepared after the bad blood was 
3 between them. Even by the dates that they have, it 
4 was transferred when there wasn't — there wasn't any 
5 business dealings between Mr. Abbott and, again, he 
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1 Mr. Mangum off his back; he could try to, you know, 
2 put things down the road. Basically, what he does is 
3 smoke and mirrors. And that's what he has done today. 
4 Same thing, he has document after document that he's 
5 used to try to deceive these people, and, you know, 
6 gave Mr. Mangum this, and then continued to try to 
7 negotiate with him so he could figure out some way to 
8 appease him without actually giving the money back, 
9 and by transferring things to him in which there was 
10 no interest. T h a f s exactly what he's done today: 
11 Just given you document after document that is just 
12 smoke and mirrors, Judge, and we would ask the Court 
13 to find him guilty of the forgery. 
14 T H E COURT: All r ight Thank you. Amber, 
15 let's make sure that the exhibits get back to me. 
16 Let me first say, thank you, Counsel. 
17 Respect is a big part of what we do here in the court 
18 system. I see that being shown today. Not only for 
19 each other but to the Court as well as to the 
20 witnesses who testified and all others that were 
21 involved and you should be commended for that. 
22 My plan is to review these documents, 
23 these exhibits that have been presented, go over my 
24 notes and come back with a verdict today. I don't 
25 think that it will take me, hopefully, as long as a 
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1 had no authority to make any transfer at that t ime. 
2 And that's — that's exactly the way the 
3 Defendant set this up, because then if Mr. Mangum came 
4 back and sued somebody, he could say: "You can't sue 
5 Keystone. This is signed by Mr. Abbott." And so his 
6 only recourse would have been against Mr. Abbott, who 
7 had no interest and no ability to sign any documents 
8 or transfer them. 
9 Now, Mr. Mangum gave the Defendant 
10 approximately $175,000. He was to get — there were a 
11 couple of things he was to get in return. He was 
12 supposed to get payments, monthly payments, and also 
13 an interest in that property. He did not get those 
14 things. 
15 The document that was given to him gave 
16 him absolutely nothing because it had Scott Abbott's 
17 name on it, because it was never recorded and because 
18 there wasn't — there was no equity in the property to 
19 be given to him. And so the document was completely 
>0 fraudulent. 
>1 It was supposed to be giving him a secured 
12 interest, which it did not do. It did not give him 
IZ anything. 
IA judge, I think clearly the Defendant 
£5 structured this so that he could try to keep 
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1 jury would. But I think that I have taken enough 
2 notes and I know what I need to look at and what I 
3 want to look at, in my mind. So, if you wouldn't mind 
4 waiting around. And if I think it's going to take 
5 longer, I'll have Amber just get your cellphone 
6 numbers and then I'll get back with you before too 
7 long. But I'd like to take care of this today. And 
8 that way we can move forward with this. 
9 "" So, we'll be in recess. 
10 (Recess.) 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, please be seated. 
12 Okay. We are back on the record in the 
13 matter of State of Utah versus Kelly James Robbennolt, 
14 Case 091401782 
15 All parties are present, including the 
16 Defendant, Mr. Robbennolt. 
17 This is a criminal action involving the 
18 charge the Forgery, a Third Degree Felony being 
19 alleged against Mr. Robbennolt. 
20 After having heard the evidence and 
21 testimony of three witnesses, Mr. Abbott, Mr. Mangum, 
22 as well as Mr. Nixon, that's all the witness testimony 
23 that I received along with the exhibits that I have 
24 had'a chance to overlook. And there were some other 
25 additional information provided by Mr. Hartley 
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i regarding Kind or the setup or the reasoning 
2 background for what happened here. 
3 And the proof in criminal cases is beyond 
4 a reasonable doubt 
5 The State has that burden and in this case 
6 for the charge of Forgery, it's pretty clear as to the 
7 first few elements: It's no question that 
8 Mr. Robbennolt, on or about January 9th, 2009, Utah 
9 County, did submit a document to Mr. Mangum, 
10 purporting to transfer an interest in some property in 
11 Montana. That was signed by Mr. Abbott. That's been 
!2 acknowledged. There's no dispute as to that. 
3 The question is: Did he do that to 
4 defraud? Was his purpose to defraud? And so I've set 
5 forth some things here that I want to mention. 
6 Credibility of the witnesses is always at 
7 issue in these types of cases. No question that's 
8 what it usually comes down to. And we had three 
9 witnesses today, and in my mind in watching and 
0 listening, in trying to establish what their thinking 
1 might have been, it's dear to me that all parties 
2 were credible in what they were trying to relate to 
3 the Court. 
I And so I would commend them for that. Not 
5 always do we get witnesses up that tell the truth, but 
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I I think that was the case today. All witnesses were -
I relating their remembrance of the facts in a way that 
I was truthful. 
I Money, money, money is what we're dealing 
> with here. That's the ultimate cause of what's going 
> on. And then I put down here: Trust, trust, trust. 
' That's what I was getting from the testimony and what 
l was being relayed. 
> No question the Court does find that 
!
 Mr. Robbennoft had no authority to sign on 
Mr. Abbott's behalf. This is relayed by the fact that 
Mr. Abbott's signature was needed because the property 
was in his name. He had to sign even though 
Mr. Robbennolt was part of Keystone because of his 
history or background. At feast \n this transaction, 
he wasn't a signer. It was all In Mr. Abbott's name. 
I felt that conspicuously absent from the 
documents I received was something from Mr. Kasir in 
the agreement that he entered into with Keystone with 
regard to his interest. 
I didn't have that. I would have like to 
have maybe seen that to see if, in fact, Mr. Abbott 
had signed off on that agreement and where that is, I 
don't know. But I thought maybe that could have been 
important here. 
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1 Was there any contact made with Mr. Abbott 
2 regarding the transaction by Mr. Robbennolt? Not that 
3 I could see. He did this on his own. Normally in 
4 business relationships, I would think, especially when 
5 that interest is gone, that authority would still be 
6 out of respect and trust, at least asked of, mentioned 
! 7 to, something. But I don't see that that was the case 
8 here as well. 
9 And I put down here as well: Why didn't 
10 the Defendant, Mr. Robbennolt, sign his own name? 
11 Because he couldn't. He needed Mr. Abbott's 
12 signature; that authority wasn't given. And, again, 
13 it seems to me that Mr. Robbennolt was trying to do 
14 what he could to make things right. I think you get 
15 yourself involved in these kind of things and you do 
16 things to try and make it right and then you hope that 
17 later you can fix the situation. This is a lot of 
18 money involved. And I think he was trying to do the 
19 right thing, but it doesn't detract from fact that no 
20 authority to sign and he was trying to defraud in 
21 accordance with what the elements are of the charge. 
22 Therefore, based upon that, the Court does 
23 judge Mr. Robbennolt guilty of the crime of Forgery, a 
24 Third Degree Felony. And therefore, at this point, we 
25 just need to set a time for sentencing. 
223 
1 - Mr. Hartley, shall we refer the matter to 
2 AP&P; is that the State's request as well? 
3 MS. RAGAN: It \sf Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Robbennolt, 
5 you'll need to report to Adult Probation and Parole no 
6 later than 4:00 o'clock tomorrow, provide them 
7 information they need to complete a presentence 
8 report. 
9 Sentencing in this matter will be set for 
10 - it looks like April the 11th at 9:30 in the 
11 morning. 
12 Where it is a bench trial, Ms. Ragan, I'm 
13 not sure that you need to prepare findings in order. 
14 We can just use our minute entry, but that will be 
15 your choice. 
16 _ MS. RAGAN: I did take some notes, 
17 Your Honor, so... 
18 THE COURT: Again, I appreciate Counsel 
19 and their efforts today. I would like to keep these 
20 exhibits at least until such time as sentencing. 
21 Did you want these back, Mr. Hartley? 
22 These weren't actually — 
23 MR. HARTLEY: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: And is that date going to be 
25 good for you on the 11th? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
MR. HARTLEY: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. That will j 
take care of it. We'll be in recess. Thank you. 
(Trial Adjourned at 3:49 p.m.) 
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